

Ex-CIA big sees flaw in SALT pact

By JOSEPH VOLZ

Washington (News Bureau) — In what is expected to become a major issue in the coming congressional debate over a strategic arms limitation treaty with the Soviet Union, high-level CIA official warned yesterday that U.S. spy satellites at present lack the capability of seeing that the Soviets do not cheat.

Retired Army Lt. Gen. Daniel Graham, former deputy director of the CIA, said that the Russians know about America's "sophisticated KH-11 spy system and may now know how to get around our chief verification capability."

Graham's warning will be echoed many times in coming months by opponents of the proposed Salt 2 treaty. Although the pact is not likely to be wrapped up and signed by President Carter and Soviet President Leonid Brezhnev until February, it is already being hotly debated in Washington.

Cites sale of manual

Graham and other hard-line opponents of the treaty contend that the Soviets have consistently cheated on previous agreements and will cheat in the future unless the U.S. comes up with a foolproof verification system.

Graham said it would be several years before the U.S. could put up the satellites needed to count the Soviet ground missiles and their clusters of warheads.

At a press conference sponsored by the American Conservative Union, Graham put great emphasis on the Soviet Union's purchase of a manual for the KH-11 spy system used in the "Big Bird" satellite. A low-level CIA employee, William Kampiles, has been sentenced to 40 years in prison for selling the manual to a Soviet agent for \$3,000 last February.

Pentagon officials have downplayed the loss of the manual, arguing that the Soviets already knew the basic details of the system, which can photograph objects three feet tall from a height of 100 miles and transmit the pictures back to ground receiving stations.

On the other hand

But Graham, who worked on the KH-11 spy system while at the CIA, contends that not only was the satellite the "most heavily used" U.S. spy system, but the Soviets also did not know it could take pictures.

Graham also hinted that the spy system had another capability which has not been revealed by other U.S. intelligence sources — the ability to penetrate through the nose cone of a Soviet strategic missile to "see" how many nuclear warheads are inside.

Until now, U.S. officials have contended that U.S. satellites could not determine how many warheads were on

a missile but would just assume that certain missiles were multi-tipped.

Pentagon and CIA sources, who do not wish to be named, argued that Graham's view is too narrow — and besides what can the Soviets really do even if they know the full story on the spy system? Big strategic missiles are too hard to move or camouflage, considering that U.S. satellites also have X-ray and heat-sensing capabilities.

In addition, the National Security Agency has electronic eavesdropping satellites circling the earth. These can pick up the Soviet radar and radio communications that are necessary for any missile testing. No new missile could become operational without testing.

Says publicity hurt

Graham also contended that U.S. SALT verification has been weakened because of Senate and House Intelligence Committee hearings on CIA misdeeds. He said that informers overseas are now hesitant to step forward and work with the CIA.

But despite recent complaints from President Carter that U.S. technical intelligence has been overemphasized, satellites do provide the vast majority of information.

Former CIA Director William E. Colby says that no system is 100% foolproof, but when the alternative — an escalating arms race — is considered, U.S. verification is sufficient.

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